Vault on your own folder, sync always without conflicts, serious encryption, on-device biometrics and zero network, except for updates and free for life in Standard edition — here is TuaPass. Every few months the same story breaks: a cloud service was breached, a password manager had an incident, a browser extension exfiltrated credentials. At that point the question is always the same. Were your secrets on their servers, or on your disk? The best-known password managers ask three things of you at once: an account, a subscription, and — above all — to entrust your vault to infrastructure you don't control. It works, until it doesn't. But the model is that: you are a user of a service. The files aren't yours. The sync isn't yours. Trust is a contract, not ownership. TuaPass was born from the opposite idea. Your data stays on your computer, in an encrypted folder you can put wherever you want. No TuaPass account. No server that "holds" the vault. No proprietary sync to depend on to open your passwords. What makes it different isn't a longer feature list than the competition. It's an architecture designed for real-world use: multiple devices, a storage service you already have, and zero dependence on us.

The problem others don't want to solve

Syncing a vault between two computers seems like a detail. It isn't. If the vault is a single file (or a single database) and you put it in Dropbox, OneDrive, or Google Drive, this happens. You open TuaPass on your laptop, edit an entry. At the same time, or before sync finishes, you open the other PC and edit another. The third-party service sees two versions of the same file. It produces a "conflicted copy", mixes up timestamps, sometimes keeps the wrong copy. In the worst case you lose an edit. In the even worse case you corrupt the archive. Cloud managers avoid the problem by keeping the vault with them and acting as arbiter. It's convenient. It's also why your secrets transit on machines that aren't yours, tied to an account, subject to policies, jurisdictions, incidents. TuaPass rejects both extremes: neither "a single file you mustn't let two PCs touch at once", nor "our cloud that decides for you". The vault is a folder. The sync is done by the service you chose. The anti-conflict logic is in the file format.

A vault designed for third-party services

TuaPass has no cloud of its own. The vault is a folder on disk. You can keep it local, on a USB stick, on a home-network NAS, or — and this is the use case it was designed for — inside Dropbox, OneDrive, Google Drive, Syncthing, Nextcloud, an SMB share, whatever you already use, for short. We don't ask you to trust a new account. We ask you to use the storage you already consider yours. Inside that folder there isn't a monolithic database rewritten on every save. There's a deliberate design:

  • a manifest with public metadata (algorithms, salt, unlock verification): it contains no passwords;

  • an operations folder (ops): every vault modification produces a new file;

  • a snapshot folder, used to keep the state compact without losing recent history.

The key is the second point. Every save, every new entry, every deletion does not overwrite an existing file. It produces an immutable operation file, with a unique name made of date, time, and identifier. That file is never reused and never rewritten.

Two PCs working in parallel don't contend for the same path. Each adds its own files. Dropbox (or whoever) copies both, because they are distinct objects. When the folder aligns, TuaPass recomposes the state in memory: it reads the operations, orders them deterministically, and applies the last-write-wins rule. The most recent change wins; at equal timestamp, a fixed criterion (device, then operation identifier) removes any ambiguity. The same vault, on the same set of files, always produces the same result.

This is what we call anti-conflict technology. It's not "magic merge" in the cloud. It's an append-only format designed so third-party services can do their job: copy files, without becoming the arbiter of your secrets.

Disk writes are atomic: a temporary file is written and then replaces the target. No half-written vault if power fails or the sync client intercepts an incomplete save.

The practical result is simple to live with. Put the TuaPass folder in OneDrive. Use it at the office and at home. You don't have to "close the app on the other PC" before opening this one. You don't end up with vault (Mario's conflict).db. You choose where it lives. TuaPass takes care of not breaking it.

Solid crypto, not "marketing crypto"

Unlocking the vault requires the master password. From that password TuaPass doesn't just "check a hash and call it a day": it derives a key with Argon2id, today's reference KDF against brute-force attacks. Argon2id doesn't just do many hash rounds: it consumes memory, and this makes attacks on GPUs and dedicated hardware prohibitively expensive. Default parameters align with OWASP guidelines (tens of mebibytes of RAM, not just a high iteration count). With that key, data is encrypted with AES-256-GCM. GCM doesn't just give confidentiality: it gives authentication too. A tampered, truncated, or "fixed" file from a botched sync isn't silently accepted. Either it decrypts, or it fails. On disk, even if the folder is on a third-party cloud, anyone opening the files sees blobs. The KDF salt is in the clear on purpose: it's not a secret, it's a public ingredient of the derivation. The secret is the master password, and that never leaves the device. There is no TuaPass account to send the key to. There is no server-side "password recovery", because there is no server side of the vault. If you lose the master password, no one — not even us — can reconstruct the content. It's uncomfortable to write in an article, but it's the honest price of real privacy. A detail that matters for sync: the biometric unlock, discussed below, does not weaken this scheme. Windows Hello doesn't replace Argon2id; it wraps a copy of the already-derived vault key locally. The file on the cloud stays encrypted as before.

Simplicity of use, without an account to manage

No security course is required to get started. TuaPass is a Windows desktop application: choose or create the vault folder, enter the master password, and work. No registration. No email code. No "family plan" your file opening depends on.

Inside you find what you need every day, organized by type:

  • Web logins — username, password, URL, email, TOTP / 2FA, recovery codes;

  • Secure notes;

  • Payment cards (cardholder, number, expiry, CVV, PIN);

  • Identities (personal data, contacts, document);

  • Wi‑Fi networks;

  • Servers (host, port, protocol, credentials, key path);

  • Folders to keep order, with search on the list.

The interface is that of a manager, not a web service: new entry, edit, delete, import, lock. You can leave TuaPass in the notification area. You can ask for automatic UI lock after a period of inactivity: to see credentials again you need master password or biometrics. The browser extension (Chrome, Edge, Firefox) talks to the application locally. It offers credentials on the right page and lets you save new ones. The site you're visiting doesn't "see" the vault. The extension sends nothing to a TuaPass server: the bridge is between browser and app on your PC. No online dashboard. Nothing to remember beyond the master password and the folder you chose.

Biometrics on every device and only on that device

Unlocking every time with a long password is correct, but tiring. In the long run you pick a shorter password, or leave the vault open. TuaPass integrates device biometrics so the password can stay strong and daily use stays light. On Windows it's Windows Hello: fingerprint, face, PIN, or security key — whatever the PC already offers. At vault creation, if Hello is available, TuaPass can enroll device unlock. After that, you open the app and unlock without retyping the master password. The password remains the foundation: Hello is a local shortcut, not a cryptographic substitute sent over the network. The difference from many managers is where that convenience lives.

The biometric enrollment stays on the single computer, outside the synced folder. Unlock blobs live in the Windows user's local data, not in Dropbox. Every device you use TuaPass on can enable its own unlock: the laptop with fingerprint, the desktop with face, a third PC with password only. The vault that runs on the third-party service does not contain fingerprints, faces, PINs, or computer unlock keys. It contains only encrypted data. Change machine? Set up Hello on the new one, once, after opening the vault with the master password. The vault is the same. Biometrics belong to the device, not the file. This is the meaning of "on any device": not a fingerprint traveling with the files, but every device that can unlock with what it has, without polluting the synced copy.

Offline by design, not by accident

TuaPass security doesn't depend on a server policy, an expiring certificate, or an API that's "up today, down tomorrow". It depends on the fact that the application doesn't talk to the network.

It sends no telemetry. It doesn't upload the vault. It doesn't verify passwords against a breach service. It has no account to authenticate to. There's no backend that sees which sites you save. Your secrets stay between the disk, the process memory, and — if you want — the browser extension, locally.

This changes the threat model concretely. An attack on the "TuaPass cloud" can't exfiltrate user vaults, because that cloud doesn't exist. An order to a provider to hand over data from a TuaPass account has no object. What remains, obviously, is the surface of your PC and the storage service you chose: but there the files are encrypted, and the key is nowhere unless derived by you.

The only exception is deliberate and minimal: update checks. At startup TuaPass queries a version file on the distribution server. If a newer release exists, it can download the installer (with integrity verification). Nothing else. No account. No vault content. No site list. No periodic "presence ping".

If the PC is offline, TuaPass keeps working. Passwords are there. The extension is there, if browser and app run locally. Updates wait for the next connection.

Many products call themselves "zero knowledge" and still have an account, proprietary sync, an app that phones home. TuaPass is more radical: zero communication, except that one version line.

TuaPass Standard: perpetual, free license

TuaPass Standard is the complete product for everyday personal and professional use. The license is perpetual and free: you install it, use it, keep it. No expiration. No subscription to keep opening the vault. No "trial period" after which files become inaccessible.

Anti-conflict vault, Argon2id and AES-256-GCM encryption, local biometric unlock, browser extension, import, entry types, UI lock: all Standard. Version updates arrive through the same minimal channel described above.

You pay, if and when you want, only for potential extra evolutions, not for the right to use what you already have. The vault you create today stays yours tomorrow, with or without us.

It's a product choice, not a discount. A password manager that charges a fee to read your own files contradicts the very idea of "your data is yours". TuaPass Standard makes the opposite explicit.

Who it's for (and who it's not)

TuaPass is for anyone who wants a serious manager without entering a walled garden. For those who already have Dropbox or OneDrive and don't want a second cloud. For those who work on multiple Windows PCs and have already been burned by conflicted files. For those who prefer an app that, when the network is unplugged, keeps doing its job. For those who believe the master password should be the only secret, not an account plus a token plus a corporate policy. It's not (yet) the product for those who only want a phone and no desktop. It's not a "family" service with granular per-entry sharing via accounts. It's not a substitute for an HSM or an enterprise flow with mandatory SSO. It's a local vault, syncable by you, encrypted well, designed to stay understandable.

In summary

TuaPass is unique because it rejects the "trust our cloud" model:

  • the vault is your folder, ready for Dropbox, OneDrive, Google Drive, a NAS, or a USB stick;

  • anti-conflict technology (immutable operations, never rewritten, state recomposed deterministically) makes sync on third-party services an intended use, not a gamble;

  • encryption is Argon2id + AES-256-GCM, with authenticated data, not a slogan;

  • biometric unlock belongs to the device, not the file that travels;

  • the app is offline, except for the update check on the distribution server.